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Abstract 
 
An Equilibrium Problem with an Equilibrium Constraint (EPEC) is a mathematical construct that can 
be applied to private competition in highway networks. In this paper we consider the problem of finding a 
Nash Equilibrium in a situation of competition in toll pricing on a network utilising two alternative 
algorithms. In the first algorithm, we utilise a Gauss Seidel fixed point approach based on the cutting 
constraint algorithm for toll pricing. The second algorithm that we propose, a novel contribution of this 
paper, is the extension of an existing sequential linear complementarity programming approach for 
finding the competitive Nash equilibrium when there is a lower level equilibrium constraint. Finally we 
develop an intuitive approach to represent collusion between players and demonstrate that as the level of 
collusion goes from none to full collusion so the solution maps from the Nash to monopolistic solution. 
However we also show that there may be local solutions for the collusive monopoly which lie closer to 
the second best welfare toll solution than does the competitive Nash equilibrium. 
 
Keywords: Sequential Linear Complementarity Programming (SLCP); EPEC; Competition; Nash 
Equilibrium; Collusion. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The motivation of the research in this paper stems from the observation that in recent 
years there has been increasing amount of private sector participation within areas that 
are conventionally the privy of the public purse. The driving force behind this change is 
the assumed higher efficiency of the private sector coupled with increasing public 
pressures on governments for accountability and the corresponding need to derive value 
for money from their various budgetary commitments which are ultimately funded by 
the tax paying public. 
In highway transportation, privately operated roads are not novel concepts (Viton, 
1995). However there has been little analysis on this topic in terms of the competition 
between private sector providers and the equilibrium outcomes, save for theoretical 
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studies often restricted to networks with two parallel links (e.g. Verhoef et al, 1996; de 
Palma and Lindsey, 2000). In reality, there have already been examples of private sector 
involvement in road construction and operation around the world (Fisher and Babbar, 
1996; Roth, 1996)1. In return for the private capitalists funding large amounts of initial 
capital investments for the construction of the road, they are contractually allowed to 
collect tolls, for some agreed duration from users when the road is finally opened (Engel 
et al, 2002). In an era when government budgets are becoming increasingly tight and 
with traffic congestion becoming more of a problem in many major cities, the private 
sector is recognised as having an increasing role to play in the provision of traditional 
highway transportation investment. When the private sector is tasked with the provision 
of such services and in competition with others simultaneously doing the same, the 
concept of Nash equilibrium (Nash, 1950) can be used to model the equilibrium 
decision variables offered to the market.  
In this paper we consider the problem of toll optimisation in modelling the situation of 
private sector participation in the operation of transportation services. In the case of toll 
only competition, we provide two heuristics for the solution of the problem. The first is 
simply a Gauss Seidel fixed point approach based on the cutting constraint algorithm for 
toll pricing which builds on our previous work (Koh et al, 2009). The second algorithm 
that we propose, a novel contribution of this paper is an extension of the existing 
Sequential Linear Complementarity Programming Approach (SLCP) for finding the 
competitive Nash equilibrium when there is a lower level equilibrium constraint. 
Although SLCP has previously been formulated for a general Nash game (Kolstad and 
Mathiesen, 1991), we believe this to be the first application of the approach to an EPEC 
problem where the toll operators compete at the upper level but are bound by the lower 
level equilibrium of the user response in terms of demand and route choice. This 
application of SLCP to an EPEC should be useful in other fields such as the electricity 
market. We present various examples from the same network to illustrate the 
performance of these heuristics and compare the competitive solutions with both 
monopolistic and second best welfare maximising regimes. These examples include 
both parallel and serial links in competition. Finally, we consider how to model 
collusive behaviour between operators and propose an intuitive structure which allows 
this response to be modelled. With this natural structure we show that when moving 
from no collusion through partial collusion to full collusion a path is drawn between the 
Nash and monopoly solutions. Where an un-priced substitute link is present local 
optima may exist which we suggest may be more likely than a true global solution 
which has interesting implications for policy-makers and the behaviour of toll operators. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. In the next section, we define the problem 
considered along with the concept of Nash Equilibrium from Nash (1950) which serves 
as the foundation of non-cooperative games that we discuss. Section 3 then outlines two 
heuristic algorithms for the problem. Section 4 utilises numerical examples to illustrate 
the performance of the algorithms. In Section 5 we relax the notion of non-cooperative 
behaviour and consider if it is possible for the players to signal, through their selection 
of strategic variables, to their competitor, their intention to collude such that they end up 
in a monopolistic equilibrium. Finally in Section 6, we summarise our results and 
provide directions for further research. 
                                                 
1
 There are in fact real world examples of such competition, in Australia, private operators compete with 
public operators for toll revenues on the Sydney Orbital Motorway Network. See 
http://www.rta.nsw.gov.au/usingroads/motorwaysandtolling/index.html, accessed July 2009. 
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2. Problem Context 
 
Our problem is to find an optimal equilibrium toll for each private operator2 who 
separately controls a predefined link on the traffic network under consideration. We can 
consider this problem to be a Cournot-Nash game between these individual operators. 
The equilibrium decision variables can be determined using the concept of Nash 
equilibrium (Nash, 1950) which we define as follows: 
 
2.1. Nash Equilibrium 
 
In a single shot normal form game with N players indexed by i,j∈{1,2,...,N}, each 
player can play a strategy ui∈Ui which all players are assumed to announce 
simultaneously. Let u=(u1,u2,…,uN)∈U be the combined strategy space of all players in 
this game and let ψi(u) be some payoff or profit function to player i∈{1,2,...,N} if the 
combined strategy is played. The combined strategy tuple is a Nash Equilibrium 
u
*
=(u*1,u*2,…,u*N)∈U for the game if the following holds 
 
* * *( , ) ( , ) , , {1,2,... },i i j i i j i iu u u u u U i j N i jψ ψ≥ ∀ ∈ ∀ ∈ ≠  (1) 
 
Equation (1) states that a Nash equilibrium is attained when no player in the game has 
an incentive to deviate from his current strategy. She is therefore doing the best she can 
given what her competitors are doing (Pyndyck and Rubinfeld, 1992). 
 
2.2. Problem Definition 
 
We now outline the problem we wish to solve as viewed by each operator with 
equilibrium conditions imposed on the users’ route choice. 
 
Define: 
A: the set of directed links in a traffic network, 
B: the set of links which have their tolls, B A⊂  
K: the set of origin destination (O-D) pairs in the network 
v : the vector of link flows [ ],av a A= ∈v   
τ : the vector of link tolls [ ],a a Bτ= ∈τ  
c(v) : the vector of monotonically non decreasing travel costs as a function of link 
flows on that link only 
[ ( )],a ac v a A= ∈c  
µ : the vector of generalized travel cost for each OD pair [ ],k k Kµ= ∈µ  
d : the continuous and monotonically decreasing demand function for each O-D pair 
as a function of the generalized travel cost between OD pair k alone, [ ],kd k K= ∈d  and 
−1D : the inverse demand function 
Ω : feasible region of flow vectors, defined by a linear equation system of flow 
conservation constraints. 
                                                 
2
 As the research transcends both game theory and market structures in the context of highway 
transportation, we will use the terms “private operators” and “players” interchangeably throughout.  
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If we assume that each player is able to control3 only a single ith link in the network 
then, following Yang et al (2009), the optimisation problem for each ith player, which 
represents the maximisation of the profit for the operator,4 is formulated as follows: 
 
( ) ( ) ,Max
i
i i iv i N
τ
ψ τ= ∀ ∈τ τ  (2) 
 
Where vi is obtained by solving the variational inequality (see Smith, 1979;  
Dafermos, 1980) 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )* * * *, , 0  for ,T T−⋅ − − ⋅ − ≥ ∀ ∈1c v τ v v D d τ d d v d Ω  (3) 
 
The objective for each firm (payoff) is the toll revenue obtained by charging tolls on 
the link operated by the ith player. 
 
Note that the vector of link flows can only be obtained by solving the variational 
inequality given by (3). This variational inequality represents Wardrop’s user 
equilibrium condition which states that no road user on the network can unilaterally 
benefit by changing routes at the equilibrium (Wardrop, 1952). Throughout this paper, 
we make the additional simplifying (yet not uncommon) assumption that the travel cost 
of any link in the network is dependent only on flow on the link itself so that the above 
variational inequality in (3) can be solved by means of a convex optimisation problem 
(Beckmann et al, 1956). 
 
 
3. Two Heuristic Algorithms for EPECs 
 
The problem we have defined in the previous section is in fact an Equilibrium 
Problem with Equilibrium Constraints (EPEC) (Mordukhovich, 2005, 2006; Su 2005). 
In essence the EPEC’s are problems of finding equilibrium points of players when they 
are bound by constraints specifying an overall system equilibrium. The study of EPECs 
has only recently surfaced as an important research area within the field of mathematics 
but has significant practical applications e.g. in deregulated electricity markets (Ralph 
and Smeers, 2006). 
In this paper, we propose two alternative heuristics for the resolution of the problem. 
The first algorithm is the diagonalisation algorithm which is a modified version of the 
non-linear Gauss-Seidel method (as discussed in e.g. Ortega and Rheinboldt (1970); 
Judd, 1998). The second algorithm is a novel heuristic derived from reformulating the 
standard Nash game from economics as a complementarity problem and solving it using 
a Sequential Linear Complementarity Programming approach (SLCP). The extension is 
to apply this SLCP approach within the EPEC setting as described earlier.  
                                                 
3
 Control is used as a short hand to imply that the firm has been awarded some franchise for operating the 
link. 
4
 Here we have assumed no costs of toll operation for ease of presentation, however these can be 
introduced quite easily. 
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3.1. Diagonalization Algorithm (Algorithm 1) 
 
One of the first algorithms introduced for this problem was that of decomposing the 
problem into a series of interrelated optimisation problems and subsequently solving 
each individually. This is also known as a fixed point iteration algorithm which has also 
been referred to as the Gauss-Jacobi algorithm. In economics, Harker (1984) 
popularised this algorithm for solving a Cournot-Nash game. In a similar fashion, 
Cardell et al (1997) and Hobbs et al (2000) have used the diagonalisation algorithm to 
solve EPECs arising in the deregulated electricity markets. 
 
The algorithm is presented as follows: 
 
Diagonalisation Algorithm 
Step 0: Set iteration counter k=0. Select a convergence tolerance 
parameter, ε(ε>0). Choose a strategy for each player. Let the 
initial strategy set be denoted 
1 2
( , ,..., )
N
k k k k
u u u u= . Set k=k+1 and go 
to Step 1. 
Step 1: For the ith player i∈{1,2,...,N}, solve the following optimization 
problem: 
1 max ( , ) , {1, 2,... },
i i
k k
i i i j
u U
u u u i j N i jψ+
∈
= ∀ ∈ ≠  
Step 2: 
If 1
1
N
k k
i i
i
u u ε+
=
− ≤∑  terminate, else set 1k k= +  and return to Step 1. 
 
In step 1, we utilise the Cutting Constraint Algorithm (CCA) (Lawphongpanich and 
Hearn, 2004) to solve the optimisation problem for each player holding the other 
player’s strategic variables fixed. Further details regarding the CCA are provided in the 
appendix to this paper.  
The convergence proof of the diagonalisation algorithm when applied to single level 
Nash equilibrium problems can be found in Pang and Chan (1982) or Dafermos (1983). 
However the proof depends on certain conditions that may not be satisfied in an EPEC, 
particularly the concavity of the payoff functions. In fact, convergence of the algorithm 
relies on the concept of diagonal dominance of the Jacobians of the payoff functions 
(Gabay and Moulin, 1980, Theorem 4.1 p. 280), which intuitively requires that a player 
has more control over his own payoff than do his competitor(s). Therefore we propose 
this algorithm to be a heuristic approach for the EPEC at hand. 
 
3.2. Sequential Linear Complementarity Programming Algorithm (Algorithm 2) 
 
Since the game between the operators in this paper is akin to a Nash game, the second 
algorithm reformulates the Nash game as a complementarity problem. Adopting this 
approach, Kolstad and Mathiesen (1991) developed a Sequential Linear 
Complementarity Programming (SLCP) approach to solve the resulting reformulation. 
The extension below is to re-formulate this within the EPEC framework whereby the 
Nash game is played out at the upper level between the toll operators while the user 
equilibrium conditions are respected at the lower level – hence and equilibrium problem 
with equilibrium constraints. At each iteration, the main problem is linearised (using a 
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first order Taylor expansion) at a given starting point. Then the sub problem is solved as 
a linear complementarity problem for which the algorithm of Lemke (1965) can be 
applied. As far as we are aware, this is the first application of the algorithm to the EPEC 
and should be useful in other fields.  
To demonstrate the approach, recall that the profit of the firm i  is given by (2). The 
first order conditions of a profit maximum for each firm are therefore given by (4)-(6) 
as follows: 
 
0ii
i
f ψ
τ
∂
= − ≥
∂
 (4) 
0i i
i
ψ
τ
τ
∂
=
∂
 (5) 
0iτ ≥  (6) 
 
These first order conditions define a complementarity problem (CP) as characterized 
by the system (7) which is to: 
Find Nτ +∈ℜ given : N Nf R R+ →  such that 
 
( ) 0
( ) 0
0
T τ
≥
=
≥
f τ
τ f
τ
 (7) 
 
If we linearise f  at 0τ (some arbitrary starting vector of tolls) using the first order 
Taylor expansion, then we obtain 0 0 0 0( / ) ( ) ( )( )Lf f fτ τ τ τ τ τ= + ∇ − . Hence, following 
(Kolstad and Mathiesen, 1991), the resulting Linear Complementarity Program (LCP) is 
to find jτ +∈ ℜ  such that 
 
0( / ) 0,
( ) 0,
0
T
Lf q M
q M
τ τ τ
τ τ
τ
= + ≥
+ =
≥
 (8) 
 
Where 0 0 0( ) ( )q f fτ τ τ= − ∇  and 0( )M f τ= ∇ . 
 
In summary the proposed algorithm is as follows: 
 
Sequential Linear Complementarity Programming Algorithm 
Step 0: Choose some starting vector of tolls τ0. Select a convergence 
tolerance parameter, ε(ε>0), and set k=k+1 and go to Step 1. 
Step 1: Solve the traffic assignment problem (3) with τk. 
Step 2: Employ finite differencing to approximate f(τk) and ( )kf τ∇  
Step 3: Solve the LCP (8) to obtain τk+1 
Step 4: Check convergence: If max 1( )kf τ ε+ < , terminate else set k=k+1 
and go to Step 1. 
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Note that in order to solve the LCP5, we require both the Jacobian of the profit 
function f(τk) for each firm in the game at iteration k and the Hessian (M). To do so, we 
solve a traffic assignment problem at kτ and perturb the tolls by using the method of 
central differences (i.e. via a combination of forward and backward differencing) to 
approximate the gradients. The underlying assumption here is that the derivatives exist 
and can be approximated in this way6.  
As with the diagonalisation approach, the convergence proof of this algorithm relies 
specifically on the concavity of the payoff functions of each firm (Kolstad and 
Mathiesen, 1991, Theorem 1, p 741). While this assumption is usually acceptable in 
modelling the classical Nash game for which it was developed, it may not be satisfied in 
a general EPEC setting.  
 
 
4. Numerical Examples 
 
In this section, we provide examples of how the proposed heuristics are used to solve 
for the optimal tolls. In addition, we compare the equilibrium outputs under the 
scenarios of competition, monopoly and under the policy of (second best) social welfare 
maximisation. 
In the case of monopoly, we assume there is a single private operator controlling the 
predefined links in the network. Hence this is a simpler problem that can be solved 
directly using the CCA (see the Appendix) or any derivative free direct search method 
(e.g. Hooke Jeeves direct search (Hooke and Jeeves, 1961) or Nelder Mead Simplex 
algorithm (Nelder and Mead, 1965)). For the results presented here, the CCA was 
utilised. 
Similarly in the case of social welfare maximisation by levying toll charges only, the 
central planner solves the following problem. 
 
( )
1
0
Max ( ) ( )
. .
,
0
kd
a a a
k K a A
d x c v v
s t
τ
τ τ
−
∈ ∈
−
∈ Ω
≤ ≤
∑ ∑∫
v d
 (9) 
 
Where τ is the pre-specified upper bound on tolls on tolled links, [ ],a a Bτ τ= ∈ . The 
CCA algorithm can be utilised for this problem as in Koh et al (2009). 
 
The example used is taken from Koh et al (2009). The link specific parameters and 
the elastic demand functions can be found therein. This network has 18 one way links 
with 6 origin destination pairs (1 to 5, 1 to 7, 5 to 1, 5 to 7, 7 to 1 and 7 to 5).  
                                                 
5
 In terms of implementation, to solve the SLCP in Step 2, we used the PATH solver (Ferris and Munson, 
2000) within MATLAB. 
6
 We have made use of finite differencing to obtain first and second order derivatives despite there being 
alternative methods based on sensitivity analysis (Yang and Huang, 2005) proposed for obtaining these 
derivatives. We apply finite differences as this is simple to apply and is often used in the estimation of 
gradients in much numerical work. 
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Two parallel link scenarios are considered in this numerical example. In Scenario 1, 
Links 3 and 4 in Figure 1 are the only links in this network that are subject to tolls. In 
Scenario 2, Links 7 and 10 are the only links subject to tolls in the network. Note that in 
all which follows we set the maximum allowable toll to be 5000 seconds. The bound of 
5000 was chosen as this translates into a practical toll level of approximately £6 which 
is considered to be reasonable maximum on the basis of acceptability for a toll on one 
link. As we demonstrate later this upper bound will only apply to one link in the 
monopolistic case. We also look at serial link scenarios with Scenario 3 tolling links 3 
and 7 where there is an element of route choice for the users to avoid both links and 
Scenario 4 tolling links 1 and 3 where there is no route choice to avoid the toll on link 1. 
 
1
2
3
6 11 7
94
5
14
13
17
16
18
15
8
10 12
1 2 5
3
4
76
 
Figure 1: Network for Example 1. 
Source: Koh et al (2009). 
Table 1: Comparing Solution by Alternative Algorithms for competitive tolls. 
 Diagonalisation7 SLCP8 
 Link Toll 
(secs) 
Iterations CPU Time 
(secs) 
Toll 
(secs) 
Iterations CPU Time 
(secs) 
Scenario 1 
 
3 
4 
530.63 
505.65 
25 
 
1213.7 
 
530.55 
505.62 
6 
 
9.8 
 
Scenario 2 
 
7 
10 
141.37 
138.29 
25 
 
1200.8 
 
141.36 
138.29 
6 
 
9.5 
 
Scenario 3 
 
3 
7 
248.62 
   97.84 
23 
 
1211.2 
 
248.65 
   98.52 
5 
 
8.3 
 
Scenario 4 
 
1 
3 
    5000 
   35.20 
19 
 
  914.9 
 
    5000 
   35.20 
5 
 
8.8 
 
 
Table 1 shows the resulting tolls, number of iterations and CPU9. times required for 
each algorithm to converge to the Nash solution. As shown the resulting tolls are almost 
identical and any differences are due to the convergence criteria used. The proposed 
SLCP algorithm uses fewer iterations and is much faster than the diagonalisation based 
approach – requiring less than 1% of the CPU time. 
                                                 
7
 Using the diagonalisation algorithm with CCA (Algorithm 1) and a termination tolerance of ε  = 1e-06 
8
 Using the SLCP algorithm (Algorithm 2) with a termination tolerance of ε  = 1e-06. 
9
 CPU time refers to the time taken by the central processing unit of the computer to perform the 
evaluation using of the respective algorithms to the precision tolerances specified. 
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Table 2 shows the tolls, the revenues collected and the change in social welfare for 
each toll pair under (a) the competitive case, (b) the monopoly case and (c) the second-
best welfare case where operators are assumed to co-operate to maximise social welfare. 
Firstly, the table shows that when there are no alternative routes available (as in the case 
of Scenario 1 where Links 3 and 4 are tolled), the monopolist can charge the maximum 
toll allowable for link 3. In fact the upper bound of the toll here is a binding constraint 
on the toll in the monopoly case. The toll on link 4 is lower due to the slightly longer 
free-flow travel time. A check with both tolls set at 5000 seconds showed that the total 
revenue was indeed lower than shown in table 2 (being only 3,555,289 seconds). As 
may be expected with the monopolistic case the impact on welfare is negative. However 
in the case of two competing operators, each player has no alternative but to succumb to 
the strategy charged by the other and hence ultimately both are only able to charge a 
much lower toll (around 10% of the monopolist’s toll). The overall welfare change for 
Scenario 1 under competition is reasonably close to that of second best social welfare 
maximisation, but is as expected lower. 
Table 2: Tolls, Revenues and Social Welfare under Alternative Market Structure Assumptions (Tolls in 
seconds, Revenue and Welfare Change in seconds per hour). 
  
Competition: Revenue 
Maximisation 
Monopoly: Revenue 
Maximisation 
Second Best Welfare 
Maximisation 
 Link Toll Revenue Welfare 
Change 
Toll Revenue Welfare 
Change 
Toll Revenue Welfare 
Change 
Scenario 1 3 530.63 461,882 87,633 500010 2,543,530 -1,581,256 510.93 449,583 87,818 
Parallel 4 505.65 420,293  4986.73 1,013,577  488.13 407,301  
Total Revenue   882,175   3,557,108   856,883  
           
Scenario 2 7 141.37 105,295 187,422 713.19 280,255 150,587 181.83 116,209 202,311 
Parallel 10 138.29 100,848  709.53 266,465  179.30 110,580  
Total Revenue   206,143   546,720   226,783  
           
Scenario 3 3 248.65 146,756 -88,020 242.01 147,209 -76,956 0 0 95,795 
Serial 7 98.52 54,309  92.54 54,275  141.89 74,027  
Total Revenue   201,065   201,482   74,027  
           
Scenario 4 1 5000 3,552,057 -1,590,050 5000 3,553,670 -1,585,945 488.21 836,935 87,818 
Serial 3 35.20 11,122  26.73 10,513  22.74 20,008  
Total Revenue   3,563,179   3,564,184   856,943  
 
The more interesting case emerges in Scenario 2 when there is an un-tolled alternative 
(Link 17 in Figure 1) available for travel into destination Zone 5. In this situation, even 
a monopolist controlling both Links 7 and 10 together cannot charge the maximum 
allowed toll of 5000 seconds on each link to maximise his revenue. Here the tolls are 
                                                 
10
 As the original network parameters included an elasticity of -0.58 for this case (with constant elasticity 
demand function) a true unbounded toll would tend to infinity. To create a reasonable unbounded solution 
with an interior solution we would have to increase the elasticity of demand. A test with elasticity of -2.0 
was conducted and this gave an interior solution with tolls of 751 and 728 seconds which are well within 
the bound of 5000 seconds. 
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limited to around 700 seconds (though the impact on welfare is positive). In the case of 
competition, Table 2 shows that the tolls charged and the total revenue earned are even 
lower than under that of a central planner attempting to maximise social welfare. So we 
may conclude that where there is an un-tolled alternative, competition has the effect of 
driving tolls down below the socially optimal toll level which was not the case for 
scenario 1 where there was no un-tolled alternative. The change in social welfare is still 
as expected lower under competition. 
Furthermore, the tolls are lower under competition than under monopoly. Since 
parallel links are the equivalent of substitutes in the route choice, this supports the 
general observation by Economides and Salop (1992) that competition between 
substitute products would lead to lower prices (vis-à-vis monopoly). 
The first two scenarios have focused on parallel competing links. In the case of serial 
links, economic theory suggests that the tolls would be higher under competition than 
under a single monopoly (Economides and Salop, 1992; Small and Verhoef, 2007). 
Under scenarios 3 and 4 where we have serial links in competition we verify this result 
that the tolls are indeed higher under the competitive solution than under the single 
monopoly and hence result in a greater loss in welfare. It is also worth noting that where 
there are alternative free routes as in scenario 3 then the tolls are relatively low even 
under monopoly, whereas under scenario 4 where the toll on link 1 has no free 
substitute route, then the upper bound constrains the solution and the operator of link 1 
exerts power over the operator of link 3. In these serial cases, both the competitive and 
monopolistic solution results in a negative welfare change compared to the second best 
welfare maximising tolls implying that with competition, society is worse off which has 
crucial implications for policy makers. They should consider carefully whether to allow 
direct competition in the serial link case. 
 
 
5. Possibilities for Collusion between Operators 
 
This section of the paper investigates collusion and considers whether it is possible 
for operators to receive signals from a competitor to achieve the revenues associated 
with monopoly control over their networks. In this section of the paper, our examples 
are restricted to games with two players. To this effect, we introduce a scalar, α  
(0 ≤ α ≤ 1) which represents the degree of co-operation between the players when they 
optimise their toll revenues for links under their control.  
With α, we can consider a more general form of the expression for the payoff 
function (2) as given in (10) 
 
( ) ( ) ( ( ) ), , ,i i i j jv v i j N i jψ τ α τ= + ∀ ∈ ≠τ,β τ,β τ,β  (10) 
 
Equation (10) reduces to the familiar form of (2) when α = 0; and when α = 1 the 
objective of each player is to maximise the total toll revenue of both players. Note that 
she can only however change tolls on links under her control and continues to take the 
other player’s toll as exogenous. Thus whilst the thi  player is in the process of 
optimising her revenue, she is taking into account a proportion represented by α  of 
the thj  player’s toll revenue. In doing so via the diagonalisation algorithm, she is 
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effectively “signalling” to her competitor that she wishes to “collude” to maximise total 
revenue. It is implicitly assumed that players reciprocate the actions of their competitors 
and would do likewise. Thus the α term represents some intuitive level of collusion 
between players, ranging from no collusion, through partial collusion to full collusion.  
Consider the network shown in Figure 1 and recall the two separate scenarios 
developed therein with Scenario 1 being toll revenue competition on links 3 and links 4 
while Scenario 2 represented toll revenue competition on links 7 and links 10. 
 
5.1. Collusion in Scenario 1  
 
Figure 2 shows, for the case depicted in Scenario 1, how the toll solution moves from 
the non-cooperative Nash Solution when (α = 0) towards the monopoly solution (α = 1) 
as the level of collusion is increased. In particular, when α = 1, we obtain exactly the 
same solution as the monopoly operator’s tolls as shown in Table 2. 
 
0
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lls
 
(se
c
o
n
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)
Toll on Link 3 Toll on Link 4
Collusion parameter (α)
 
Figure 2: Scenario 1: Tolls set by each operator as collusion parameter (α) varies. 
 
It can also be observed that with slightly “less than full collusion” (α= 0.95 or 0.99) 
the toll levels are also much lower thereby suggesting that less than full collusion can 
lead to substantial losses (in revenues) for both players. Figure 3 shows the revenues for 
operators of links 3 and 4 and the total revenue as the collusion parameter is varied. 
Notice that when going from a collusion level of 0.99 to 1.0 the upper bound on the toll 
becomes active which means that to generate more total revenue the operator of link 4 
must accept a reduction in revenue. This is due to the higher free flow travel time on 
link 4 and the interaction with the upper bound on tolls on link 3. Obviously this upper 
bound is theoretic here but in practical applications, there could be some upper bound 
set as part of some franchise agreement with a regulator. If this were the case then it 
would not be in the interests of the second operator to collude unless there was some 
contract to share out the resulting revenues. We therefore suggest that under such cases 
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there may be a limited collusion aspect which would bring down the tolls compared to 
the true monopolistic solution. 
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Figure 3: Scenario 1: Revenues as collusion parameter (α) varies. 
 
5.2. Collusion in Scenario 2 
 
In the case of Scenario 2, where there is an additional route (Link 17) that is not 
subject to tolls, this form of implicit collusion however does not obtain the solution 
under monopoly. In particular, consider the situation when α=1, then employing the 
diagonalisation algorithm, the equilibrium tolls obtained are as shown in Table 3. 
Table 3: Tolls and Revenues for Scenario 2 considering collusion with α=1. 
Link Toll (seconds) Revenues (seconds) 
Link 7 189.76 116,816 
Link 10 186.58 111,216 
Total Revenues  227,402 
 
Figure 4 illustrates however that the above solution is in fact a local optimum of the 
total revenue function. The results reported in Table 3 are plotted together in Figure 3 
where it is compared against the global optimum which is in fact the solution obtained 
under monopoly (see Table 2). 
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Figure 4: Total Revenue Surface as Tolls on Link 7 and 10 vary. 
 
This illustrates the general difficulty with optimisation algorithms and the potential 
for a local equilibrium to be located. There is also a possibility that in Scenario 2, there 
continues to be a link (number 17 in Figure 1) available that is in competition with the 
tolled links and hence even under collusion, there could exist an incentive to capture 
that untolled traffic by reducing the toll charge and breaking the collusion which may 
result in an alternative local solution rather than a global one. In Koh (2008), we 
presented a global optimisation algorithm to locate this global optimum based on 
particle swarm optimisation (PSO). However it is not clear whether the behaviour of the 
operators would allow them to find the global optimum in this case. PSO is based on 
some learning scheme – but to learn how such a surface operates requires an element of 
trust in your competitor. It is our view that the diagonalisation approach better 
reproduces realistic behaviour of operators and tests with other initial toll levels or 
starting points all result in the local rather than global solution. This suggests that the 
local monopoly solution may be the more likely of the two outcomes which has 
significant implications for both policy-makers and operators as here the tolls are lower 
and closer to second best welfare maximisation. 
To reinforce this claim we show in Figure 5 that as the collusion parameter is 
increased then the tolls on links 7 and 10 do in fact move from the Nash tolls to this 
local monopolistic toll set. This time, as the tolls remain within bounds, the move 
towards the monopoly solution is smooth and the revenues increase for both operators 
as α is increased. 
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Figure 5: Scenario 2: Tolls as collusion parameter (α) varies. 
 
5.3. Collusion in Scenario 3 
 
For the serial links 3 and 7 the benefits of collusion are small as the users have the 
opportunity to avoid the second toll and so there is little common traffic between the 
links. The tolls move smoothly between the competitive solution and the monopoly 
solution reported in table 2. 
In passing it is worth mentioning that serial links 7 and 12 or 10 and 11 result in the 
same optimal tolls for the competitive and monopolistic cases. This is because the links 
have no common traffic and can be considered as independent so there is no possibility 
of monopoly here. This shows that at the extreme the serial link result is that the 
competitive tolls are greater than or equal to the monopoly tolls. 
 
5.4. Collusion in Scenario 4 
 
In this case, as the collusion parameter (α) varies, the toll on Link 1 remains constant 
at 5000 seconds (the upper bound). However, the toll for Link 3 decreases smoothly 
towards the monopolistic toll as shown in Figure 6. Figure 6 also shows the revenue for 
link 3 which decreases as the level of collusion increases. This is the same effect as was 
seen for scenario 1 as the stronger operator is bound by the upper limit on the toll. In 
order to generate more revenue in total the weaker operator must accept a lower 
revenue, so there is no incentive to collude here without a revenue sharing agreement. 
Thus we can say for both the serial and parallel case where one operator becomes 
limited by some upper bound on the toll level then there will be no incentive to collude 
for the second operator. 
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Figure 6: Scenario 4: Toll and revenue on link 3 as collusion parameter (α) varies. 
 
 
6. Summary and Conclusions 
 
The first element of this paper demonstrated the use of two heuristics to solve the toll 
competition problem which is basically an Equilibrium Problem with Equilibrium 
Constraints or EPEC. The first was simply a Gauss Seidel fixed point approach based 
on the cutting constraint algorithm for toll pricing which builds on our previous work 
(Koh et al, 2009). The second algorithm which is a novel contribution of this paper is 
the extension of an existing Sequential Linear Complementarity Programming approach 
for finding the competitive Nash equilibrium when there is a lower level equilibrium 
constraint. Although SLCP has previously been formulated for a general Nash game 
(Kolstad and Mathiesen, 1991), we believe this to be the first application to an EPEC 
problem where the toll operators compete at the upper level but are bound by the lower 
level equilibrium of the user response in terms of demand and route choice. This 
application of SLCP to an EPEC was shown to give the same solution as the 
diagonalisation approach but with significantly lower computation time. (We believe 
this approach could prove useful also in other fields such as analysing deregulated 
electricity markets.) 
The second element of the paper compared the competitive, monopolistic and second 
best welfare maximising solutions for both parallel and serial link toll operation. These 
tests confirmed that in the parallel link case competitive tolls are lower than monopoly 
tolls and are reasonably close to second best welfare tolls. In the serial link case we also 
confirmed that the competitive tolls were greater than (or equal to) the monopoly tolls 
and that the welfare level is lower under competition than under monopoly. This would 
suggest that regulators should not allow direct competition in the serial link case. 
However for both the serial and parallel cases it was also shown that the presence of un-
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tolled alternatives reduces the toll levels and so reduces opportunities for monopolistic 
behaviour. 
The third element of the paper introduced an intuitive formulation of collusive 
behaviour. To this effect, we introduced a collusion parameter to reflect the degree of 
cooperation between operators. Implicit in the assumption was that operators would be 
willing to reciprocate the action of the other and we have ignored the associated issues 
of stability of coalitions formed. Nevertheless, even for the simple examples presented 
in this paper, we have found the potential for multiple equilibria to be obtained. 
Furthermore we demonstrated that in all cases as collusion increases from none through 
to full collusion then the tolls map from the Nash solution to the monopoly solution in a 
smooth manner. Where a local monopoly solution exists then the collusive behaviour 
can also map toward this local monopoly rather than the global one which is by 
definition more acceptable to the public in terms of welfare change. 
 However for both the serial and parallel cases where the first operator is limited by an 
upper bound on the toll level then to increase total revenue the second operator must 
accept a reduction in revenue. Thus there is no incentive to collude in this case unless 
there is some form of agreement to share revenues set up in advance. 
There is much scope to develop this work further considering the case of asymmetric 
collusion where one operator colludes more than the other which takes us into the area 
of leader-follower games such as Stackelberg. In terms of algorithms there is the 
obvious extension to the case of more than two operators which raises the question of 
whether the heuristics will converge with more complex tolling systems. In addition, the 
analysis presented in this paper can be employed to study competition between cities 
intending to introduce road pricing and/or other demand management or capacity 
enhancement measures. These serve as topics for further research which could build on 
the findings presented here. 
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Appendix 
 
The Cutting Constraint Algorithm (CCA) 
 
Mathematical Program with Equilibrium Constraints 
 
In the case of a single operator (operator is a used here generically) who sets tolls 
and/or capacities to optimise some objective function which could be to maximise social 
welfare in the case of a local authority or to maximise profit in the case of a private 
firm. This optimisation problem is effectively a Mathematical Program with Equilirium 
Constraints (MPEC). The economic paradigm for a generic MPEC is based on the 
setting of a Stackleberg game where the leader sets his strategic decision variables and 
the road users on the network follow. In optimising his objective the decision maker has 
to take into account the responses of the road users whose route choice is given by 
Wardrop’s Equilibrium Condition. A large amount of development has occurred in this 
branch of mathematical optimisation (Luo et al 1996) which has applications in e.g. 
mechanics, robotics and transportation analysis. The primary difficulty with the MPEC 
is that they fail to satisfy certain technical conditions (known as constraint 
qualifications) at any feasible point (Chen and Florian, 1995; Scheel and Scholtes, 
1995). In recent research, Koh et al (2009) investigated the use of the cutting constraint 
algorithm (CCA) (Lawphongpanich and Hearn, 2004) to solve an MPEC in the context 
of second best congestion pricing and capacity optimisation. 
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Reinterpretation of Variational Inequality Condition  
 
Let us define the 2 additional variables 
 
aβ : a pre-specified upper bound on capacities, [ ],a a Bβ β= ∈  
τ : a pre-specified upper bound on tolls, [ ],a a Bτ τ= ∈  
 
As we have defined in the main paper, the feasible region of flow vectors, Ω, is a 
linear equation system of flow conservation constraints. 
From convex set theory, e.g. (Bazaraa et al 2008, Theorem 2.1.6 p.43), (v,d) ∈Ω can 
be defined as a convex combination of a set of extreme points. Hence we can rewrite the 
equilibrium condition (3) using the following: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )* * * *, , , , 0  for T Te e e Eτ β τ β−⋅ − − ⋅ − ≥ ∀ ∈1c v u v D d q d  
 
Where (uε,qε) is the vector of extreme link flow and demand flow indexed by the 
superscript e, and E is the set of all extreme points of Ω. 
 
A Cutting Constraint Algorithm for the MPEC 
 
The Cutting Constraint Algorithm redefines the variational inequality using the 
extreme points. Together with the initial extreme point, generated by an initial shortest 
path problem, and the constraints defining feasible flows, the master problem is solved 
to find the optimal tolls and capacities at each iteration. Subsequently new extreme 
points (“cuts”) are found by solving a sub problem using the results for the current 
iteration. 
 
The CCA Algorithm is as follows:  
 
CCA Algorithm 
Step 0: Initialise the problem by finding the shortest paths for each O-D 
pair; set l (iteration counter) = 0; define the aggregated link flow and 
demand flow (ul,ql); and include (ul,ql) into E. 
Step 1: Set l=l+1. Solve the Master Problem with all extreme points in E 
and obtain the solution vector (v,d,τ,β); then set (vl,dl,τl,βl). 
Step 2: Solve the Sub Problem with (vl,dl,τl,βl) and obtain the new extreme 
point (ul,ql). 
Step 3: Convergence Check:  
If ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )1, , , , 0TTl l l l l l l l l lτ β τ β−⋅ − − ⋅ − ≥c v u v D d q d , terminate and 
(vl,dl,τl,βl) is the solution, otherwise include (ul,ql) into E and return 
to Step 1. 
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The Master Problem in Step 1 is defined as follows:  
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1
, , ,
* * * *
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The sub problem of Step 2 is a shortest path problem which is formulated as follows:  
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )
1
,
min , , , ,
. .
,
TT
s t
τ β τ β−⋅ − ⋅
∈ Ω
u q
c v u D d q
u q
 
 
 
Further details of our implementation of the algorithm can be found in Koh et al 
(2009). Our numerical experiments indicate that for a small network tested in that paper, 
CCA obtained the global solution in a large number of test instances (as verified against 
a multi-start derivative free Hooke Jeeves (Hooke and Jeeves, 1961) method. Instances 
where it failed could be resolved by modifying the variable bounds which is recognised 
as a common obstacle in applying gradient based non linear programming methods to 
solve MPECs. 
